In his 1967 book, Edward F. Denison examined the question of "Why Growth Rates Differ." Since his work, and that of Angus Maddison's early work, this question has been asked over and over again, with a longer list of countries, better data, and ever more sophisticated analytical techniques. Despite the many advances and growing insights into the problem described in the recent review by Bosworth and Collins (2003) , the answer remains elusive.
and not just where they are at present or have been in the past, we turn to a modified version of the Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) -henceforth MRW -model of steady-state growth. This framework allows us to estimate the equilibrium level of output per worker that is consistent with the basic parameters of growth in each meta-country (technology change, saving rates, and population growth). These estimates then permit us to compare past and future growth paths and address issues about convergence and divergence in the levels of economic development, as well as the quantitative significance of long-run factors that promote or inhibit growth.
The Theory of Empirical Growth Modeling
The conventional approach in the literature on international growth comparisons assumes that the production possibilities of an economy can be characterized by a stable aggregate production function. This function relates output (Y) to inputs of labor (L) and capital (K), with allowance for improvements in the productivity of these inputs. Under the assumption of constant returns to scale, it can be written in intensive form as y t = F(k t ,t), with the variables expressed relative to labor: y t = Y t /L t and k t = K t /L t , and the time index 't' included to allow for shifts in the function over time. This framework has the advantage that it appropriates the large literature on production and productivity to the problem of explaining cross-national differences in income per capita. However, this approach comes at a cost. The production function relates the inputs to output, not income to population. Output is not the same as income (a point evident in Appendix Table A .1), nor is population the same as labor input. There are differences among countries in the rate of unemployment, the size of the underground sector, and the nature of household and family production, and measured output per worker, y t , is therefore unlikely to be proportional to income per capita across countries or over time (although they are correlated).
We will nevertheless follow empirical practice and adopt the production function framework.
The standard graphical representation of the production model is shown in Figure 1 . This figure portrays an economy initially located at the point a on the production function prevailing in that year (1970 in this example). This production function has the Hicksian form, y t = A t F(k t ), indicating that productivity change affects all combinations of k t proportionately. An increase in the efficiency index, from A 70 to A 00 in the year 2000, causes the production function to shift upward as in the figure. This shift is often associated with the adoption of better technologies over time. However, it actually represents a costless improvement in the effectiveness with which capital and labor are used, and it is more appropriately characterized as a change in total factor productivity (TFP). TFP excludes the systematic development of technology paid for by R&D expenditures, but includes the part resulting from R&D externalities, learning, or pure inspiration. In addition, it includes changes in organizational efficiency, and institutional factors such as the legal and regulatory environment, geographic location, political stability, as well as deeper cultural attitudes that affect the work place. It also sweeps in all other factors not explicitly included in measured input: omitted variables like infrastructure capital, variations in the utilization of capital and labor (e.g., unemployment), and measurement errors (for further discussion, see Hulten (2001) ).
Output gets a further boost, in this example, from an increase in the capital-labor ratio from k 70 to k 00 . Because of diminishing returns to capital, the production function is shown with a concave shape. Each increment of capital per worker yields a proportionately smaller increase in output per worker. With technology held constant, this increase is represented by the move from point a to point b on the lower A 70 branch of the production function. The total change in output per worker in Figure 1 is from y 70 to y 00 , that is, from point a to point c, and is the sum of the capital deepening effect, from point a to point b, and the TFP effect, from point b to point c.
The relative size of these two effects is the point at issue in the capital versus efficiency controversy, and it is this split that we attempt to measure in this paper.
Estimation Procedures
A number of different approaches have been used in empirical growth analysis. Some studies use an econometric approach in which the production function in Figure 1 is given an explicit functional form and the parameters of that form are estimated. Various methods are available, but those that make use of times-series data are sensitive to measurement error and incomplete data, while those based on cross-sectional data typically impose a common production function across countries and may be sensitive to which countries are included in the sample. Neither is entirely suitable for the study of low income countries, which tend to have both inadequate and incomplete data.
Non-parametric techniques tend to be more forgiving of weak data, and are widely used.
The two main alternatives are the Solow (1957) growth-accounting model and the Data Envelopment Analysis approach. We use the Solow model in this paper, as extended by Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) , to facilitate comparison with the literature. The Solow model provides an accounting framework, based on the Divisia index, in which the growth rate of output per worker (y t ) is equal to the growth rate of capital per worker (k t ) weighted by its share in GDP, plus a residual factor that accounts for all the remaining growth in y t not explained by the weighted growth of k t . 1 Solow shows that, under the assumption that prices are equal to marginal costs, the income shares are equal to output elasticities, and the share-weighted growth rate of k t is associated with the movement along the production function from a to b in Figure 1, i.e., with capital deepening, and the residual is associated with the shift in the production from b to c. The Solow sources-of-growth decomposition thus provides a method of resolving the total change in y t into the capital-deepening effect and the TFP effect.
Sources-of-Growth Data and Estimates
The sources-of-growth framework requires times series data on real output, labor input, capital stocks, and labor's share of income. These data are constructed for a total of 97 countries over the period 1970-2000. The list of countries, along with selected statistics, is shown in Table A .1 of the Data Appendix. In order to facilitate comparison, these countries are grouped into six 'meta' countries, based on the World Bank classification by income level. The 31 Low Income countries are located in Africa, with only three exceptions. The 22 Lower-Middle Income countries are developing economies spread throughout the world, as are the 14 Upper-Middle Income countries. The 23 High-Income countries are basically those of the OECD. In addition, we have constructed two small meta-countries: four "Tigers" (Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan), and three Large Countries (Brazil, China, and India).
Our principal data source is the Penn World Tables 6.1 (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2002) , from which real GDP (chain weighted) and real investment are obtained (both in power purchasing parity 1996 US dollars), as well as our labor force estimates. Real investment is used to compute the capital stock in international prices (details of this computation are given in the Appendix). 2 These data yield the estimates of y t and k t required by the sources-of-growth model.
The final piece of data used in the paper, the country labor income shares, β, is obtained from the United Nations Statistical Yearbook (various issues) and is simply computed as Compensation to Employees in GDP.
The estimates of β suffer from the well-known problem that they are implausibly low.
Indeed, the average shares shown in Figure A .2 indicate an average labor share of only 0.30 for the low income countries, ranging upward to 0.55 for those in the High Income category. This situation undoubtedly reflects an undercount of the income accruing to labor, especially in low income countries where there are many self-employed and family workers, and many undocumented workers in the underground economy (see Gollin (2002) , and the additional remarks in the appendix of this paper). As with other studies, these data limitations force us to adopt the assumption that income shares are the same for all countries, and set labor's share at two-thirds of income. This is a common assumption in the literature, and it is more a matter of necessity than accuracy since the implausibility of the published data does not necessarily imply that the true labor share should be the same in every economy, much less a two-thirds share. 3 2 In the few cases where there were missing end years to the data series we have used the growth rate of real GDP in US$, published in the World Bank's World Development Indicators 2004, and extrapolated our data based on these. For a more thorough discussion of the data and some adjustments made to the data on labor force, we refer the reader to Isaksson (2006) . 3 If, for example, the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital is low, a low wage economy will tend, all else equal, to have a smaller share of its income given to labor than a higher-wage economy with the same technology. A constant labor share is therefore not a theoretical necessity, even if technologies were there same across countries in every industry, and the composition of industries happened to be the same.
We will therefore present two sets of sources-of-growth estimates, one set calculated with a twothirds labor share and another based on the average measured shares for each meta country.
These estimates are shown in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. The first column of Table 1 indicates that output per worker grew strongly over the period 1970 to 2000 in the High Income countries, but was actually negative in the Low Income group. The Lower Middle and Upper Middle Income meta countries display a positive growth experience, but still lag the growth rate of High Income leader. The Tiger and Large meta countries, on the other hand, outperformed the leader in terms of growth. However, it is also the case that they started from a lower level of output per worker.
The second and third columns of Table 1 show the sources-of-growth decomposition of the growth rate of output per worker into its capital-deepening and TFP components, based on the assumption that labor's income share is 0.67 for all countries. It is evident that capital deepening is the predominant source of growth in the Low, Lower Middle, and Upper Middle Income countries, that it accounts for about half of the growth in output per worker in the High Income and Tiger countries, and is slightly less than half of the growth of the Large countries.
This speaks directly to the question posed in Figure 1 about the relative magnitudes of the growth rates associated with the effects (a to b) and (b to c): capital deepening, not TFP, is the dominant effect, although TFP is an important contributor in half of the meta groups.
However, there is an important caveat. A comparison of the Low Income and High Income cases indicates that two-thirds of the cross-sectional difference in the growth rate of y t is due to the difference in TFP growth rates. Moreover, the TFP effect accounts for more that half of the corresponding growth differential in the other countries. In other words, capital deepening is the dominant source of growth over time in all but the most rapidly growing countries, but TFP is a more important factor in explaining cross-sectional differences in growth performance.
These results are very consistent with the estimates of Bosworth and Collins, who use a similar set of assumptions and methods.
The results shown in Table 2 replay Table 1 using the average measured share of labor income, β, as estimated from the data (see Table 7 ). Since the share in the sources-of-growth model is a surrogate for the associated output elasticity, the shift to the actual β greatly decreases the output elasticity of labor and increases that of capital, thereby giving greater weight to the growth rate of k t and strengthening the capital-deepening effect. In the case of Low Income countries, for example, the increase in the capital elasticity is from 0.33 to 0.70, with a slightly smaller increase for other countries. The effect of this change is evident in the second and third columns of Table 2 . Capital deepening is now the overwhelmingly dominant source of growth over time in all the meta countries, although TFP is a still an important factor in explaining cross-sectional differences in growth performance, with the exception of the most rapidly growing countries. The results do not have an equal footing with those of Table 1 , in our view, because of the implausibility of the measured shares. However, there are plausibility issues with the assumption that all countries have the same constant labor share, given the structural differences among the economies of the world. The fact that the two approaches give such different results highlights the importance of 'getting the shares right' in order to have an accurate picture of the growth process.
Levels Versus Growth Rates
Tables 1 and 2 approach the analysis of growth by examining the rate of growth of y t and the fraction explained by capital deepening and TFP. There is a parallel issue about the corresponding levels: what fraction of the level of y t is explained by the level of the capitaldeepening effect and the TFP effects. In other words, what is the actual magnitude of the distances (a to b) and (b to c) in Figure 1 , and how much of the overall gap (a to c) do they explain? The answers to these questions can be very different from the one obtained in the preceding section with growth rates. Compare, for example, two economies that start with different levels of productive efficiency. Economy A is on the higher of the two production functions in Figure 1 at point e, and economy B on the lower one at point a. Both have the same initial capital-labor ratio, k 70 , but different levels of output per worker, y 70 versus y 00 in the figure. Suppose that, from this staring point, both economies only grow by capital deepening at the same rate of growth. That is, they move along their respective production functions at the same rate, but neither experiences any growth in productivity (neither function shifts). In this example, the entire growth rate in output per worker is due to capital deepening, but all the difference in the level of output per worker is due to the different level of productive efficiency. Table 3 suggests that something like this occurs for many of the countries in our sample.
The first column of this table reports the level of output per worker in the first five meta countries relative to the level of the High Income countries. This column conveys the same sense of the gap between rich and poor countries seen in Figure 2 , which plots the paths of y t over time for the four largest groups of countries and the Tigers. The second column of Table 3 shows the relative levels of TFP, based on the extension of the sources-of-growth model to levels pioneered by Jorgenson and Nishimizu (1978) , and developed by Caves, Christensen, and Diewert (1982) . The CCD model is a Törnqvist index of the level of productivity in each country relative to the average of all countries. It measures the TFP of any country, relative to the average of all countries, but compares the percentage deviation of y t from its international mean with the percentage mean deviation of k t , weighted by the average of the country's own income share and the international average. It is clear from this table that the level of TFP in the first five meta countries is significantly below that of the High Income countries, and, while similar in pattern, are somewhat more compressed than the relative levels of output per worker.
The latter is 16 times greater in the High Income countries compared to the Low, while the gap in productive efficiency is 'only' a factor of 5. Figure 3 displays the time series trends that correspond to column 2. It reveals the same general magnitude as the relative TFP estimates of Table 3 , and also indicates that the gap has widened over time for the Low, Lower Middle, and Upper Middle countries, but that the Tiger countries are narrowing the gap in the relative TFP level, though not shown, the same is true of the Large meta country.
The last three columns of Table 3 decompose the level of output per worker into its capital-deepening and TFP components. This decomposition is based on the assumption that the production function has the simple constant-returns Cobb-Douglas form y t = A t k t
(1-β) (this is implicit in the assumption of a constant value of the labor share, β). The variable A t is the basis for TFP in the Solow model, and the level of TFP can thus be estimated as the ratio y t /k t (1-β) .
This 'CD' index is not necessarily equivalent to the CCD index, but when the β shares the same value for each country, and the Cobb-Douglas index is normalized to the High Income countries, it gives the same values as the CCD index (thus, the numbers in columns 2 and 3 are identical).
To assess the relative importance of capital deepening and TFP on the level of (unnormalized) output per worker, the logarithm y t is divided between the logarithms of A t and k t
( 1-β) . This decomposition is shown in the last three columns of Table 3 , where it is apparent that the TFP is the predominant factor explaining the level of output per worker. Moreover, a little more than half of the cross-sectional variation among countries is explained by the difference in the level of TFP. This result shows that the potential disconnect between the growth-rate analysis of Table 1 and the level analysis of Table 3 This finding points to a fundamental problem faced by the lower income countries. Table   1 suggests that their growth is propelled more by capital deepening rather than TFP growth, but Young (1992 Young ( , 1995 , who found that the contribution of TFP was small or even negligible.
These conclusions must be tempered by the reminder that they are based on the assumption that labor's income share is 0.67 in all countries. Again, the use of labor's actual income share assigns a much greater role to capital formation. The actual shares may be implausibly low, but they reveal that the sources-of-growth analysis is sensitive to this variable, and that much more needs to be known about it before the capital versus productivity issue is settled.
Two Alternative Paradigms
The dichotomy shown in Figure 1 is based on Solow's 'Hicksian' approach, that is, it measures the shift in the production function at a constant capital-labor ratio (at k 00 in the figure).
However, this is not the only way to proceed. Hulten (1975 Hulten ( , 1979 argues that the shift could equally be measured from the Harrodian perspective of a constant capital-output ratio, as it is in neoclassical growth theory. This involves measuring the shift along the ray, P, from the origin.
In the example of Figure 1 , this way of measuring the shift in the production function explains all of the growth in output per worker because the terminal point c lies on P. Capital per worker still grows from k 70 to k 00 , but the increase in capital has been 'induced' by the shift in technology through the savings effect. This is the induced accumulation effect of Hulten (1975) ,
and it must be counted as belonging to productivity change in order to accurately portray the contribution of TFP to the growth process. 4
The Harrodian version of the growth decomposition is shown in the last two columns of Table 1 . In practical terms, Harrodian TFP in column 5 is computed by dividing the corresponding Hicksian estimate in column 3 by labor's income share. This procedure results in a larger effect attributed to productivity, since part of the growth k t is reassigned to TFP. 4 The induced accumulation effect arises because an increase in productivity leads to more output per worker for a given level of input, and some of this extra output is saved, leading to more output, more saving and so on, until the point c in Figure 1 is reached. This extra output is the result of the shift in the production function and should be counted as part of TFP, not as exogenous capital formation. Technical change need not be Harrod neutral for this approach to work. If the actual equilibrium point y 00 were to lie somewhere to the right of c, the shift in the function would still be measured along the line P from a to c. The increase in y 00 beyond c would be attributed to autonomous capital formation.
The Hicksian and Harrodian approaches clearly give very different results, leading to the question of which is the 'right' one to use. The answer is that both are right, but for different questions. In order to find out how efficiently existing labor and capital are used, the Hicksian approach is the right way to proceed. Two countries may have the same amount of labor and capital, but different levels of output per worker. The gap is due to productive efficiency and its magnitude and causes are worth knowing. However, if the question is about the relative importance of capital deepening versus efficiency change as the cause of growth, the Harrodian model gives the right answer, since capital formation is endogenous. We will study this issue more deeply in the following section on growth theory.
Endogenous growth theory offers a third approach that interprets the efficiency shift in Figure 1 entirely in favor of capital formation. In the framework developed in Lucas (1986) and Romer (1986) , capital throws off externalities that explain the apparent shift in the production function in Figure 1 . As capital per worker grows from k 70 to k 00 , the direct effects to the owners of capital appear to be a move from point a to point b. But output is also affected by spillover externalities created by the capital that the owners do not recognize, and it is these externalities that account for the apparent change in productive efficiency, b to c. 5 What seems to be a shift in the production function is actually the movement along the line P, which can therefore be interpreted as the effective production function itself. Thus, what appears to be TFP in previous frameworks is really the unobserved effect of capital formation in the endogenous growth approach.
Since TFP is endogenous in this approach, it presents a different decomposition than the Hicksian and Harrodian cases recorded in Table 1 . An endogenous-growth decomposition might therefore be added to this table, with the capital-deepening effect shown in a sixth column and the TFP effect in a seventh. However, the new column 6 would equal the entire growth rate of output per worker, and the column 7 would contain nothing but zeroes, so this addition is unnecessary.
The endogenous growth explanation of the growth process is a competitor of the other two approaches, not a complementary way of viewing that process. It imposes a very different interpretation of TFP, one that is the reverse of the Harrodian induced-accumulation effect. The resulting growth dynamics are also different: in the endogenous growth world, capital deepening is a necessary precursor of TFP growth, not the other way around. A synthesis of the two models would endogenize both capital and TFP, and split both capital-deepening and TFP into endogenous and exogenous components. Unfortunately, such a model is not available for empirical purposes. It is perhaps best not to impose either view on the data a priori, and start by measuring TFP in the conventional Solow way. TFP is, in any case, measured as a residual and, in the famous words on Abramovitz (1956) , is therefore the 'measure of our ignorance' about the growth process. It is also well to heed the words of one of the seminal contributors to the field of productivity analysis, John Kendrick:
'Informal incentive and innovative activity, including the myriad small technological improvements devised by plant managers and workers, was the chief source of technological progress in the nineteenth century, and is still significant (cited in Maital (1980) , page 194).'
The Predictions of Growth Theory
The divergence pattern seen in Figure 2 for the period 1970-2000 invites speculation about the economic future of the various meta countries. Unfortunately, the insights offered in the preceding sections are inherently retrospective. They are based on the experience of past decades, but do not answer to the following question: if past trends persist into the future, will they be enough to lift a poor nation out of poverty? This question is inherently about future outcomes, and the answer requires a fully-specified model of growth that takes into account the full range of factors that determine the future growth path.
We have already encountered the two main contenders for this role: the endogenous growth model and the neoclassical model of steady-state growth. The growth dynamics of the former stress the role the capital formation and predict that those countries that are able to build an initial lead in capital per worker will be able to exploit the advantage and pull away from the others. This prediction accords well with the pattern seen in Figure 2 , and implies a fairly bleak outlook for the growth of the lower income countries. However, it does not fit well with the experience of 'transition' economies like the Tigers that are able to accelerate growth by a combination of increased capital formation and more importantly, according to Table 1 , by even stronger TFP growth. The latter is due, in large part, to the opportunity to import technologies from countries near the best-practice frontier. This, in turn, may be associated with increased capital formation, which allows for the import of more advanced technologies ('appropriate' technologies in the words of Basu and Weil (1998) ). There is undoubtedly a relation between the increased capital formation and the higher rate of TFP growth seen in Table 1 for the transition economies, one that operates in both directions. However, the deeper causes and mechanisms that trigger this transition (the subject of much debate) probably involve noneconomic factors like societal attitudes, political and social institutions, and geography. The endogenous growth interpretation by itself, while offering important insights, does not seem rich enough to capture the deeper determinants of change.
Much the same might be said of the main alternative, the neoclassical model of growth.
Indeed, no quantitative model successfully endogenizes cultural and institutional factors into explanations of growth. However, neoclassical growth theory is more hospitable to the exogeneity of these factors because it also treats TFP as an exogenous variable that may depend on a set of deeper causes.
The neoclassical model has two main variants: the Solow-Swan model of exogenous saving and the Cass-Koopmans optimal growth model. We will use the former because we want to appropriate the empirical application of this model by MRW (1992) . In the simplest version of the Solow growth model, output per worker converges to a steady-state growth path along which the growth rates of output and capital are equal to the growth rate of the labor force.
Convergence occurs according to the following mechanism, described above in the discussion of induced accumulation: a constant fraction of the output per worker, σ, is set aside in each year for investment. If the resulting amount of investment, σy t , is greater than the amount of capital per worker needed to equip the growth in the labor force, η, and the depreciation of capital, δ, (η+δ)y t , then capital per worker expands, thereby increasing output per worker in the following year (but at a diminishing rate). This process is portrayed in Figure 4 , as the transition from is the actual level of y t in 1970 (the point a), and to the steady-state level of output per worker y* (the point c). The state-state y* is at the intersection of the capital-deepening line, S, and the production function, where any further savings are eaten up by the depreciation of the stock of capital and by the need to equip the growth of the work force.
Exogenous changes in the level of productivity can be represented in this steady-state model by assuming that productivity change is both labor augmenting and Harrod neutral, and grow at a rate λ. Under this assumption, advances in technology improve the productivity of labor but not capital. 6 When 8 is positive, the production function in Figure 4 shifts outward over time. If the economy is at its steady-state equilibrium, y*, a well-known property of the model causes y* to move outward along the line S, maintaining the steady state at a constant capital-output ratio. As the economy move along the steady-sate path S, y* and k* therefore grow at the same rate λ. The Harrodian measure of TFP measures the shift along the path S, and its growth rate is also λ. The equivalent Hicksian measure is βλ.
The steady-state sources-of-growth analogue to Table 1 would look rather different than the actual estimates shown in that table. The first column of a steady-state version of Table 1 would record the λ appropriate for each country, and the Hicksian dichotomy in the second and third columns would be (1-β)λ and βλ, respectively. The Harrodian decomposition in the fourth and fifth columns would have the values 0 and λ.
However, the true utility of the steady-state framework lies not in the light it sheds on the sources-of growth analysis of Table 1 , but in the analysis of future levels of output per worker, that is, in extending Figure 2 into the future to the corresponding steady growth paths. To accomplish this, we adopt a variant of the Solow growth model developed by MRW (1992) . The MRW model assumes that the production function in Figure 4 has the Cobb-Douglas form with constant returns to scale, y t = A t k t (1-β) . This equation holds in steady-state growth and allows us 6 In this approach, labor input is redefined to incorporate changes in its efficiency. A variable E t is created that equals L t times the labor-efficiency index e λ t , where λ is the rate of laboraugmenting efficiency change; output per worker is then defined in terms of E t rather than L t , as is capital per worker. The axes of Figure 4 are reinterpreted accordingly, and no further modifications to the diagram are needed. This solution maintains the nice graphical representation of Figure 4 , but, since our purpose in this paper is to explain the ratio Y t /L t rather than Y t /E t , we express the steady-state solution in natural units of labor.
to solve for an explicit value of y* as a function of the variables λ, A, η, σ, δ, and β. 7 We have estimates of the first four of these variables, and have made assumptions about the remaining two.
The steady-state solution for y* in each of the six meta countries is shown in the first column of Table 4 for the last year in our sample, 2000. The actual level of output per worker in 2000 is shown for comparison in the adjacent column. The salient result is that there is a huge gap in output per worker between the Low and High income countries (a ratio of 23 to1 in 2000), and this gap is set to persist into the indefinite future. Moreover, this is true even if the Low Income meta country's rate of productivity growth λ were to improve to the rate prevailing in the high income case. In fact, the Low Income country would have to improve the growth rate of TFP to that of the High Income country just to maintain the year 2000 gap. If the λ's shown in last column of Table 1 persist into the future, the gap will widen. Similar remarks apply to a lesser extent for the Lower Middle and Upper Middle Income meta countries. The steady-state picture is only bright for the Tiger countries, whose y* 2000 is three-quarters of the High Income amount, and whose λ is larger.
The sources of the gap are examined in Table 5 , which decomposes the gap between steady-state output per worker in the rich and poor countries into the separate contributions of capital-deepening and TFP. This analysis is parallel to the sources-of-growth decomposition shown in Tables 1 and 2, but the novelty here is that the decomposition refers to the long-run equilibrium contributions of the two sources when capital formation is endogenous (relative to a 7 Our approach differs from MRW in that we allow for the production function in Figure 4 to shift over time, while they adopt the approach of the preceding footnote.
given rate of saving). Since this is not a familiar decomposition, the graphical intuition behind the decomposition may be helpful.
In Figure 5 , an economy L is located on a production function with a lower level of productive efficiency than economy H. Moreover, economy L is on a steady-state path, S L , with a steeper slope than the corresponding path of economy H, S H , implying that the capitaldeepening effect is stronger in the latter. 8 Economy L is thus at a relative disadvantage in both its level of TFP and its long-run capital-deepening potential. As a result, L converges to point b from a, while H is moving to a higher point d from c. The difference in the level of steady-state output per worker is (y* H -y* L ), which can be decomposed into two effects: (1) the gap (y* Ly f ), the distance between the L's steady-state and the point on its own production function that economy L would attain if it operated along the path S H rather than its own S L ; and (2) the distance between the two production functions, (y f -y* L ), as measured in the Harrodian way along the path S H .
Column 1 of Table 5 shows the dollar magnitude of the total gap (y* H -y* L ) for each of the meta countries in the year 2000, while the next column gives the portion of the gap due to the difference in capital-deepening propensities, (y f -y* L ), and the last column gives the portion of the gap due to the difference in the level of technology, (y* H -y f ).
Two conclusions emerge from these estimates. First, the large gap between the High Income countries and the others evident in Figure 2 appears to be a long-run situation as long as the basic parameters of growth remain unchanged (the exception here, as before, is the Tiger countries). Second, the gap in output per worker is largely explained by the technology gap, not differences in the propensity to accumulate capital relative to the growing labor force.
Moreover, the forward-looking role played by TFP is even stronger than the role suggested by However, this result must be qualified by the fact that the decomposition is not unique, but instead depends on the growth path actually followed. One could just as well divide the gap (y* H -y* L ) into be and ed, rather than the bf and fd split on which the estimates of Table 5 are based. This second decomposition follows the path S L between the two production functions, rather than S H . The third and fourth columns in Table 6 show the split for this alternative path, and are seen to be quite different from the Table 5 split shown in the first and second columns.
The average values for the two cases are shown in the last two columns of the table, and support the conclusion that the TFP effect is still the most important source for explaining the gap (y* Hy* L ).
Conclusion
Our analysis points to the persistently low levels of technology (in its broadest sense) as the primary source of the gap between the rich and poorer countries in our sample. The conventional analysis of past growth rates tends to understate the problem, which only becomes fully apparent when the difference in levels is analyzed. Moreover, the standard steady-state growth model predicts that the large gap will not close in the future for most of the underdeveloped countries unless they are able to dramatically improve the growth rates of the capital and TFP to the magnitudes attained by the transitional Tiger countries.
It is important to emphasize, again, that not all the countries in the Low, Lower Middle, and Upper Middle income groups are subject to this pessimistic conclusion. The Tiger and Large countries in our sample prove that success is possible. It is also important to restate the warning that our conclusions must be viewed in light of significant gaps in the data. This said, however, the gaps in the levels of output per worker and TFP are simply too large to be ignored or dismissed as artifacts of mismeasurement. This suggests that even more attention should be focused on the factors that explain these gaps, for example investment in core infrastructure capital. Even though this issue has received a great deal of attention, it is not a debate that can be considered as settled. Figure 5 1. Capital stocks
We use a perpetual inventory method (PIM) to estimate the stock of capital from the investment data (the capital stock is denoted K05+S in Figure A.1.) . Under the PIM, the stock of capital at the end of year t that is available for production in the following year, K t+1 , is equal to the depreciated amount of capital left over from the preceding year, (1-δ)K t , plus the amount of new capital added through investment during the year, I t :
, ) 1 ( The δ denotes the depreciation rate here, as in the text. By substituting backward in time to some initial period, equation A.1 can be expressed in terms of the depreciated stream of investment plus the initial capital stock, K 0 :
This method of estimating the stock of capital requires time-series data on real investment, which we obtain from the Penn World Tables 6.1 (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2002 , in power purchasing parity 1996 US dollars. We have no information as to country-specific depreciation rates, so we assume a common 5 percent rate for each country.
To obtain a starting value for the capital stock of each country, we assume the country is at its steady state capital-output ratio. The steady-state benchmark value is obtained from the equation:
where k = K/Y (i.e. capital-output ratio), g = the growth rate of real Y (i.e. growth of GDP), and i = I/Y (i.e. investment rate). The steady-state growth of GDP (g) and the investment rate (i), respectively, are calculated as the annual average over 10 years (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) . Inserting these into (A.3) gives k and the benchmark is obtained by multiplying k by initial GDP. Thereafter, we add 10 years of investment to the benchmark and this marks the initial capital stock, K 0 . We have also investigated the robustness of this procedure against two other computational methods. The first alternative is to use the steady-state approach discussed above to compute the initial capital stock, K 1970 , and thereafter apply the perpetual inventory method to the remaining years (KS). Our second procedure is to use the perpetual inventory method, but this time without the steady-state approach to obtaining a benchmark, i.e. the benchmark is zero in 1960. The accumulation of 10 years of investment is then taken to represent the initial capital stock in 1970 (K05). Figure A .1 shows how the three capital stocks actually tend to converge over time and this leads us to have faith in our choice of calculating capital stock, implying a reasonably high degree of robustness to our method of estimating the initial level of capital. 0.800 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 Year Labor's share
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